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The European Community (EC) has evolved considerably since the Treaty of Rome was 
frrst implemented in 1958. To use the Euro-jargon, there has been much 'deepening' and 
'widening'. From a mere customs union with six members, it has been transformed into a 
fully  fledged  single market with twelve members  sharing common micro- and macro-
economic policies.  And by the end of the century,  the Community should become  an 
Economic and Monetary Union with fifteen or more members. 
The foundation  of European  economic  integration is internal  trade  liberalisation.  The 
process of trade liberalisation within the EC has undergone three major phases. The frrst, 
starting in 1958, was the elimination of cutoms duties and quantitative restrictions. It was 
completed in 1968 with the introduction of  a common external tariff. The second, between 
1973 and 1986, witnessed successive enlargements from six to twelve members (see Table 
1  ), but also  reduced fervour for the elimination of internal trade barriers. The last, ending 
in 1992, is the completion of  the internal market for goods, services, capital, and labour. 
The purpose of this paper is to analyse the effects of European integration on trade and 
welfare.  Analysis focuses  entirely on merchandise trade.  The remainder of the paper is 
divided into three parts. Section 2 examines the effects of  EC integration on the extent and 
type of trade inside the Community.  Section 3 studies the impact of EC  integration on 
welfare and distribution both within and outside the Community. Section 4 concludes. 
2.  Effects of European economic inte&ration on trade 
The purpose of  this section is to measure the effects of  EC integration on trade flows. Two 
separate issues are considered.  The frrst  is the extent of regionalisation associated with 
European integration. The second issue concerns the relative importance of intra- versus 
inter-industry trade. 
A.  Extent of  regionalisation 
The extent of regionalisation is commonly measured with the share of intra-area trade in 
total trade, where trade refers to exports and/or imports. An increase in the intra-area share 
is taken as verification of the effect of regionalisation on trade flows.  However, as Lloyd 
( 1992) notes, this can only be considered as weak evidence since changes in the intra-area 
share capture many other effects besides integration. 
The  regional  structure  of total  EC-12  merchandise trade  for  the  period  1958-1991  is 
reported in Table 2.1 For the moment examination will focus entirely on the first column, 
1  EC-12 refers to the present 12  EC members. Using EC12 for the entire period avoids the problems of changing 
membership. -2-
which shows the share ofintra-EC trade in total EC trade. As far as exports are concerned, 
the figures confrrm the three phases of integration presented in the Introduction. The share 
of intra-EC exports increased steadily following the Treaty of Rome, jumping from less 
than 40 percent in 1958 to nearly 55 percent in 1970. It remained roughly constant until 
1985  and increased again thereafter, reaching over 60 percent in 1990.2 The latter trend 
suggests a significant impact of  the 1992 project. 
The picture is  similar on the import side, but here the composition of trade has added a 
strong price component to the evolution in the share of intra-EC trade.  Whereas the EC 
exports  mainly manufactures  whose  price  fluctuates  relatively  little,  she  imports  large 
quantities  of raw  materials  which  have  undergone  large  price  fluctuations  during  the 
period  under  investigation.  The  share  of  intra-EC  imports  for  all  merchandise 
commodities rose from 35 percent in 1958 to nearly 55 percent in 1973. It plunged below 
50 percent in 1974-1976, after the first oil-shock, and again in 1980-1981, after the second 
oil-shock. There was a significant rise after 1985.3 
A more instructive picture of  the share ofintra-EC imports can be obtained by focusing on 
processed products. This was done by Jacquemin and Sapir ( 1988a) who examined EC-1 0 
imports for the period 1963-1983.4 They found that the share of intra-EC imports for all 
processed goods behaved differently before and after 1973.5 During the first period, there 
was a steady increase in the share from 51  to  61  percent. There was stagnation thereafter, 
with  an  eventual  decline  to  around  58  percent.  The  figures  at  the  bottom of Table  3 
indicate that this trend has not been reversed to  date. 6 This would seem to contradict the 
1992 effect detected above. 7 
Jacquertrin and Sapir (1988a) also examined the evolution in the share ofintra-EC imports  . 
for  individual  member  states  and  individual  industries  or  sectors  (i.e.  groups  of 
industries). In the former, they observed an interesting convergence phenomenon between 
old and new members after the first enlargement in 1973. This resulted from a decrease in 
the share ofintra-EC imports for the old members and an increase for the new.8 
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A  year-by-year examination of the data confirms that 1985 corresponds to a structural break in  the series.  In  1981, 
1982, 1983 and 1984 the intra-EC export share was 53.2, 54.4, 55.0 and 54.6 %, respectively. It was 57.4, 58.9, 59.8 and 
60.2 %, respectively, for 1986, 1987, 1988 and 1989. 
The intra-EC import share was 51.7% in 1984 and 57.9 %in 1986. 
EC10 excludes Portugal and Spain. 
Processed goods  as defined here comprise the products of all  the industries belonging to sectors 2, 3  and 4 of the 
NACE classification. 
There is a  slight difference in the composition of the EC between the Jacquemin-Sapir (1988a) study and Table 3. The 
latter pertains to EC-9 which, in addition to Portugal and Spain, also excludes Greece. 
Using a  somewhat different definition of processed products and looking at EC-12 trade flows, Lloyd (1992) also finds 
that the share of intra-EC imports has not significantly risen after 1985. -3-
They also found important differences across sectors and industries. It turned out that the 
evolution  observed  at the  aggregate  level  after  1973  was  the  result  of three  different 
trends:  a declining share in engineering products (sector 3), stagnation in ore processing 
and  chemicals  (sector  2),  and  a  rising  share  in  other  manufactures  and  processed 
agriculture (sector 4). The figures in Table 3 show that these trends have persisted until 
1991. 
Wide differences of  behaviour across sectors and industries confirm that import shares are 
affected by factors  other than EC  integration.  These include  changes  in external  trade 
policy and competitiveness vis-a-vis non-EC members.  Thus, the continuous decline in 
the share of intra-EC imports for footwear and clothing reflects primarily the changing 
comparative advantage of the EC  in  labour-intensive products.  On  the  other hand,  the 
steady rise in the intra-EC share for processed agricultural products is a reflection of the 
protectionist Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). 
The only way to disentangle the effect of  regional integration from other effects on intra-
area trade shares is to regress these shares on a set of  relevant variables. Such an exercise 
was conducted by Jacquemin and Sapir (1988b) who examined the 1973 and 1983  shares 
of intra-EC imports in four countries (France, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom) 
and  across  about  one-hundred  NACE  3-digit  industries.  Three  fmdings  from  their 
regression analysis are particularly relevant in the context of the present paper. First, the 
accession of the United Kingdom to  the EC has  significantly increased the share of her 
imports from other member states between 1973 and 1983.9 This supports the hypothesis 
that EC integration has had a substantial impact on trade flows.  Second, the presence of 
non-border barriers among EC members contributed significantly to lowering the share of 
intra-EC  imports  for  products  (such  as  telecommunications  equipment)  where  scale 
economies matter. This finding was cited as evidence in support of the  1992 project for 
the completion of the European internal market. to  Finally, between  1973  and  1983, the 
CAP  played an  important role in boosting the  share  of intra-EC  imports  in processed 
agricultural goods, thereby confirming its increasingly protectionist effect. 
In summary, it appears that the share of intra-EC trade has significantly increased since 
1958. Although the evidence suggests  a strong effect of EC integration, it also calls for 
two caveats. The first relates to the wide differences, across sectors, in the evolution of EC 
trade shares over time.  These differences are accounted for  by many factors,  including 
external trade policy and competitiveness. The second concerns the numerous extensions 
of  EC membership, which have played an important part in maintaining the momentum of 
integration at the level of  EC-12. 
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A similar phenomenon occurred after the accession of Greece, Portugal and Spain. See also Lloyd (1992) who shows 
clearly the diverging trends in the share of intra-area imports for EC-6 and EC-12 after 1973. 
The United Kingdom joined the EC in 1973. 
See Commission of the European Communities (1988). -4-
B.  Intra-industry versus inter-industry specialisation 
One of  the most distinctive features of  intra-EC trade liberalisation has been the growth of 
intra-industry trade. This feature was frrst noted by Balassa (1966). He  showed that the 
early (1958-1963) expansion of intra-EC trade in manufacturing took the form of intra-
industry rather than (as had often been assumed) inter-industry specialisation. This was 
confirmed over a longer period by Balassa (1975), whose results are reported in the left-
hand panel of Table 4.11  It shows a rapid increase in intra-industry specialisation in all 
member states following the Community's establishment. It also reveals that Italy stood 
somewhat apart from her partners. 
Balassa's  fmding  provoked  great  interest  on  the  part  of both  conceptual  and  policy-
oriented economists. It gave empirical support to the work by Linder ( 1961) and Dreze 
( 1961 ),  who  had emphasized the importance of product differentiation in international 
trade  among  countries  at  similar  levels  of development.12,13  It  also  reassured  policy-
makers about the consequences of trade liberalisation among industrial countries. Indeed, 
Balassa's results indicate that such liberalisation is likely to entail only modest adjustment 
costs since it leads to specialisation within industries rather than movements of resources 
from import-competing to export industries. 
A link between regional integration and intra-industry trade has been observed for other 
arrangements  besides  the  European  Community.  It  was  therefore  natural  to  examine 
whether there are reasons why economic integration may spur intra-industry trade to  a 
greater extent than extra-industry trade. This task was performed by Greenaway (1989) 
who  identified  three  channels  which  might  establish  a  causal  relationship  between 
economic integration and intra-industry trade: overlapping demands, scale economies, and 
factor movements.  Given the strong presence of all three channels in the Community, 
Greenaway (1989) concluded that there exists a deterministic link between EC integration 
and intra-industry trade. This conclusion was also reached by Balassa and Bauwens (1988) 
who  have  analysed  the  determinants  of intra-industry  specialisation  in  bilateral  trade 
among European countries. 
The importance of intra-industry specialisation in intra-EC trade has persisted over time, 
as confirmed by the figures in the right-hand panel of  Table 4. These figures indicate that 
the extent of intra-industry trade has risen in nearly all EC countries between 1970 and 
1987. At the end of  the period, three layers of countries emerged in terms of  the degree of 
intra-industry trade. At the bottom: Greece and Portugal; in the middle: Denmark" Italy, 
Ireland,  and  Spain;  and  at  the top:  Netherlands,  Germany,  Belgium-Luxembourg,  the 
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Similar results were obtained by Grubel and Lloyd (1975). These authors found that more than 70 % of the increase 
in intra-EC trade between 1959 and 1967 was in the form of intra-industry trade. 
Thus, the difference in the behaviour of Italy was ascribed to a lower level of industrial development. 
It was also instrumental in the theoretical models of Krugman (1979), Lancaster (1980) and Helpman (1981). -5-
United Kingdom, and France. In accordance with the previous discussion, the three layers 
correspond to three levels of  industrial development. 
The  successive  enlargements  have  resulted  in a  Community  which  now  incorporates 
twelve members with a much greater variance in the level of industrial development than 
was the case among the original six. The result seems to have been, after 1980, a slowing 
down  in the extent of intra-industry trade for  the more industrialised members,  which 
contrasts  with the  rapid  increase  in some  of the less-developed  members.  Hence,  the 
convergence phenomenon between old and new member states observed previously for 
the  share of intra-EC trade in total  EC  trade appears  to  extend to  the  share of intra-
industry trade in total intra-EC trade. 
3.  EfTects of European economic intecration on welfare and distribution 
As Waelbroeck (1976) correctly warned, not too much interest should attach to the effects 
of economic integration on trade. The latter is an 'irrelevant variable', interesting simply 
because of its impact on the primary objectives of economic policy, welfare and income 
distribution. 
This section examines the welfare and distributional consequences of the trade  effects 
measured  above.  It is  divided  into  two  parts.  The  frrst  explores  the  effects  of EC 
integration on the welfare of the member states. The second analyses the effects on the 
distribution  of income  both  internationally  (between  the  EC  and  third  countries)  and 
inside the EC. 
A.  Effects on welfare and growth 
The  literature  on  economic  integration  traditionally  distinguishes  between  static  and 
dynamic  effects.  The former represent changes in the allocative  efficiency of member 
states, taking their productive capacity as given. By contrast, dynamic effects measure the 
impact of  integration on the productive capacity of  member states. 
Static effects 
Economic integration is, by definition, a second-best proposition since it involves a shift 
from  one  protection-ridden  situation  (with  equal  protection  against  all  countries)  to 
another  (with  protection  against  non-partners  and  no  protection  against  partners).  Its 
welfare  consequences  are,  therefore,  an  empirical  matter  which  depends  upon  the 
particular configurations of  individual schemes. 
Traditional (Vinerian) customs union theory distinguishes between two  welfare effects: 
trade creation and trade diversion.t4 In any member state, integration reduces the price of 
14  Viner (1950). -6-
supplies from other union members relative to those from domestic producers, thereby 
creating trade at the expense of domestic production. At the same time, integration drives 
a wedge between the price of supplies from member and non-member countries, hence 
diverting trade from the latter to the former.  Trade creation increases welfare,  while in 
general diversion has a welfare cost. The net welfare effects of integration depend on the 
relative size of  trade creation and trade diversion. 
Although the second-best nature of economic integration prevents any abstract judgement 
about its welfare consequences, a presumption can be derived from considerations on the 
expected relative size of trade creation versus trade diversion. The following factors are 
generally  considered  in  the  economic  literature  as  influencing  positively  the  welfare 
effects of  trade integration:  15  a large number of members; a high proportion of intra-area 
trade before integration; low transportation costs among members; low common external 
protection. 
What has been the record of  EC integration in terms of  trade creation and trade diversion? 
After  a thorough  review of the  empirical  evidence  regarding  the  initial  phase  of EC 
integration,  Balas  sa  ( 197 5)  concluded  that  ·~rade  creation  has  been  substantial  in 
absolute terms and has exceeded trade diversion several times." (p.116). The conclusion 
only applied to manufactured goods; elsewhere the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) 
produced severe trade diversion and welfare costs. 
Balassa's view has continued to prevail throughout the 1970s and 1980s. This can be seen 
using Truman's methodology,  which is  based upon a decomposition of expenditure on 
apparent consumption into three  shares:  domestic production (net of exports),  intra-EC 
imports, and extra-EC imports.t6  For the period 1975-1982, Jacquemin and Sapir (1988a) 
found  that  cases  of trade  creation  far  outweighed instances  of trade  diversion  in  four 
member states. Table 5 extends the analysis for the period 1980-1991. The left-hand panel 
of Table  5  relates  to  all  processed  products.17  It  shows  that  for  EC-9  the  share  of 
consumption from domestic suppliers has steadily declined. At the same time, the shares 
supplied by EC partners and non-EC producers have both risen, a situation often referred 
to  as  'double  (internal  and  external)  trade  creation'.  A  drastically  different  picture  is 
painted  in  the  right-hand  panel  of Table  5,  which  focuses  on  processed  agricultural 
goods.1s  Here,  some (internal)  trade  creation  coexisted  with  (external)  trade  diversion 
from 1980 to 1985. Thereafter, only trade diversion was apparent. 
What emerges from the above record regarding the impact of EC integration on welfare is 
the  key role played by the  common  external  trade  regime.  Where  it has  been liberal 
(generally  in  manufacturing),  EC  integration  has  been  welfare-enhancing.  On  the 
15  See Balassa (1987)and Hazlewood (1987). 
16  Truman (1975). 
17  Sectors 2,3 and 4 of the NACE classification. 
18  Industry 41-42 of the NACE classification. (2) 
-7-
contrary, where the trade regime has been highly protectionist (most notably in temperate 
agriculture), integration has generated welfare costs. 
Community participation in  successive  GATT  rounds  has  been crucial  in  shaping  her 
external trade regime in manufacturing. Her active role in multilateral trade negotiations 
was dictated partly by her own liberal charter and partly by the insistence of her trade 
partners, most notably the United States. 
European integration was the main driving force behind the Dillon and Kennedy rounds of 
multilateral trade negotiations which produced substantial tariff reductions. Table 6 shows 
the average tariff rates in the EC member states in 1958  (before entry),  in  1968  (after 
entry and after the Dillon Round), and after the Kennedy Round. The figures indicate that, 
together with integration, the two GATT rounds not only substantially decreased the EC-
wide average tariff (from 13  to 6.6%), but also restored the average German tariff to  its 
low initial level. 
The above  evidence  suggests  that the  process  of EC  integration was  a  catalyst  in the 
reduction of  Europe's external protection. This view seems to be shared by most authors.19 
For instance, Hufbauer (1990)  states that  ''France  and Italy,  in particular,  would have 
strongly resisted making any trade  concessions in  the 1960s,  and Germany would not 
have made trade concessions in isolation from its continental partners." (p.5). Regarding 
France,  Messerlin  ( 1992)  notes  that  the  ''first  impact of the  Treaty  of Rome was  to 
impose  ... [a]  macroeconomic environment [which]  allowed the progressive  opening of 
the French  economy  .. As a result,  the protection granted to  the French  manufacturing 
sector vis-a-vis  both the  Community and the rest  of the  world  ... decreased  during  the 
1960s." (p.159). 
The  simultaneous  lowering  by  the  EC  of her  internal  and  external  protection  in 
manufacturing  did  not  end  with  the  Kennedy  Round  in  the  late  1960s.  The  first 
enlargement of the EC, in 1973, was followed by multilateral tariff cuts on manufactured 
goods during the Tokyo Round, which was completed in 1978. And the third enlargement, 
in  1986,  was  immediately  followed  by  the  launching  of the  still-unfinished  Uruguay 
Round. 
The situation in agriculture has run counter to that in manufacturing, with trade diversion 
far exceeding trade creation. The root of the problem lies with the de facto exclusion of 
most of  temperate agriculture from the GATT. The trade-diverting effect of the Common 
Agricultural Policy has progressively increased with each successive EC enlargement. In 
the early 1980s, the staggering costs of trade diversion provoked a rising opposition both 
within and outside the Community. The outcome was the inclusion of agriculture in the 
Uruguay Round with the view to  extending GATT discipline to this area.  Failure by the 
EC  and  her trade  partners  to  reach  agreement  in  agriculture  has,  so  far,  prevented  a 
19  For a dissenting view, see Winters (1992). -8-
successful conclusion of  the Round. The EC reforms of  the CAP (the so-called Mac  Sharry 
plan) approved in mid-1992 should, however, open the door toward such agreement. 
As yet, only two welfare effects have been considered, namely trade creation and trade 
diversion. In the presence of scale economies, however, Corden (1972) has shown that 
two additional welfare effects can be expected: cost reduction and trade suppression. The 
first arises if integration increases the scale of existing domestic production. In this case, 
specialisation  results  in lower  average  costs  of domestic  supplies.  Cost  reduction  is, 
therefore,  welfare-improving for the domestic  economy and for the union as  a  whole. 
Trade suppression occurs when imports from outside the union are replaced by newly 
established domestic supplies which, despite the fall in average costs due to integration, 
would not survive without protection. The latter effect is akin to  trade diversion:  it is 
detrimental to the union's welfare because a costlier source replaces a cheaper one. Like 
trade diversion, its magnitude depends crucially upon the external trade regime. The more 
protectionist the regime, the greater the extent of  trade suppression. 
Attempts to measure the cost reduction and trade suppression effects of EC integration 
have been few. The most significant ex post contribution is by Owen (1983), who found 
that cost reduction has been substantial for the original six EC-members. In its ex ante 
study on the impact of 1992, the Commission of the European Communities ( 1988) also 
found that the completion of  the internal market would produce a large welfare-enhancing 
cost reduction effect. 
Dynamic effects 
It has long been postulated that economic integration produces substantial growth effects 
through better exploitation of scale economies and greater competition resulting in higher 
productivity. These effects received much attention in early writings on EC integration by 
Scitovsky (1956), Allais (1960), and Balassa (1961). But measurement difficulties have 
generally precluded ex post attempts to  evaluate their importance.  This is unfortunate 
since there seems to be a consensus that dynamic effects are far larger than static ones.  2o 
An interesting exception is the work by de Melo,  Panagariya and Rodrik (1992)  who 
present  cross-country regressions  of per capita income growth on several  explanatory 
variables,  including  membership  in  regional  trade  integration  schemes.  Their  results 
suggest that EC membership has had no impact (either positive or negative) on per capita 
income growth.  21 
20 
21 
It has been estimated that the welfare gain associated with trade creation in manufactured goods amounts, for the EC, 
to 0.15 %of GNP. See Balassa (1975). 
One of the explanatory variables used in  the regressions is the share of investment in  GDP, which  is  likely to be 
positively  correlated  with  EC  membership.  The  ordinary-least-square  procedure  employed  by  the  authors  is, 
therefore, biased against finding a positive effect of EC membership on growth. -9-
Dynamic effects lie at the heart of the  1992 project. Efforts to  measure their size have 
been attempted in the ex ante studies by the Commission of the European Communities 
(1988)  and  Baldwin (1989).  The Commission's report  focused  on  one-time  effects  on 
productivity and output and estimated 1992 will raise EC output by between 2.5 and 6.5 
percent.  By  contrast,  Baldwin  measured  the  truly  growth  effect  to  be  had  from  the 
completion of  the internal market. Using a calibrated endogenous growth model, he found 
that 1992 might permanently add between one-quarter and nine-tenths of one percentage 
point to the EC growth rate. 
Economic integration is,  obviously, not the only channel available to raise the level of 
competition and produce growth effects in the European Community. An alternative (or, 
at least a complement) to internal trade liberalisation may be external trade liberalisation. 
A recent study by Jacquemin and  Sapir (1991a)  sheds  some light on this  issue.  These 
authors have examined the relative trade discipline effects of intra- and extra-EC imports 
(actual as  well as potential)  on an index of competition,  price-cost margins.  Regarding 
actual  imports,  the  study  finds  that  only  extra-EC  trade  flows  exert  a  significant 
competitive effect.  On the  other hand,  it confirms the  pro-competitive  effect expected 
from the removal of intra-EC trade barriers. These results suggest that the combination of 
internal  and  external  trade  liberalisation  may  be  a  superior  strategy  to  internal 
liberalisation  alone  as  far  as  growth  is  concerned.  Hence,  although  some  external 
liberalisation follows  automatically from the  1992  programme,  such  strategy  should be 
actively pursued. 
B.  Effects on income distribution 
European integration affects the distribution of  income, not only between the EC and third 
countries, but also inside and between member states. 
International distribution ofincome 
The effect of EC integration on non-member countries is directly related to the static and 
dynamic effects examined previously. 
Since  the  European  Community  is  obviously  a  'large'  economic  entity,  her  existence 
affects international trade prices. As a result, trade diversion and trade suppression involve 
not only a welfare loss to member states, but also a gain resulting from an improvement in 
the EC's terms of trade. The latter is due to the shift in EC demand away from products 
originating in third countries which causes a fall  in their relative price.  Obviously, this 
terms-of-trade effect is a zero-sum game:  a gain for the EC necessarily implies a loss for 
third countries. 
It has  often been suggested that improvements  in the  terms  of trade provide  a  strong 
incentive for the establishment of regional trade arrangements. In the case of the EC, the 
only empirical study available is by Petith (1977), who used an ex ante methodology to 
determine the terms of trade gains resulting from  integration in manufactured products. 
He  found  that  the  gains  from  terms  of trade  improvements  far  exceed  the  existing -10-
estimates of trade creation.  22 Hence the conclusion that:  '~he improvement of  the terms of 
trade,  as well as being the principal economic effect, was also one of  the major goals of 
the integration of  trade in manufactures by Western Europe." (p.272). 
Although the paper by Petith is frequently cited in the economic literature, it contains a 
major flaw  which seems to  have gone unnoticed.  Its central result rests on  '~he rather 
strong  assumption  that the  common external  tariff of the  union  is  exactly  half-way 
between [the] initial tariffs [of its members]." (p.264).23 In other words, the height of the 
EC-wide  average  tariff  is  assumed  to  have  been  the  same  before  and  after  the 
establishment  of the  Community.  This  completely ignores  the  substantial  cuts  in  the 
common external tariff which resulted from the Dillon and Kennedy rounds. 
In fact,  the previous discussion on the figures  in Table 6 suggests that,  with respect to 
manufacturing, the EC  meets the Vanek-Kemp-Wan test.24  She has sufficiently lowered 
her common external tariff to ensure that the rest of the world is, in general, at least as 
well off as  it would have been, ceteris paribus, in the absence of integration. Regarding 
agriculture,  however,  there  is  broad  agreement  that  the  CAP  has  been  welfare-
deteriorating  for  agricultural  exporting  nations  as  a  result  of its  depressing  effect  on 
certain commodities. 
Turning to dynamic effects, there is a general consensus that non-member countries have 
gained  collectively  from  the  income  effects  associated  with  EC  integration,  via  the 
increased demand for their exports. The effects differ among countries, depending upon 
the income elasticity of  their exports to the EC. 
On the whole, therefore, considering both static and dynamic effects, it appears that EC 
integration has generally benefitted third countries. The major exception concerns nations 
which specialise in temperate agricultural products covered by the CAP. Ex ante studies 
suggest that  1992  will have a similar positive effect,  especially if the  Uruguay Round 
succeeds in extending GATT rules to new areas (such as services) covered by the internal 
market project.25 
Distribution ofincome inside the EC 
Successive  enlargements  have  considerably  modified  the  distributional  aspects  of EC 
integration. Before the first enlargement, the Community was a fairly homogeneous group 
of countries in terms of factor endowments. Integration resulted, therefore, in an increase 
22 
23 
24 
25 
Petith's  estimates of the  gains  from  terms  of trade  improvements  range  from  0.3  to  0.9  %  of GNP,  which  is 
considerably more the 0.15 % referred to in footnote 21. 
For simplicity, Petith assumes that the EC comprises only two members, one with low initial tariffs (Germany) and 
the other with high initial tariffs (France). Hence the tenn 'half-way'. 
Vanek (1965) and Kemp and Wan (1976). 
See Sapir (1990)  and Hufbauer (1990).  There are some fears,  however,  about the  impact  of 1992  on developing 
countries. See Koekkoek et al. (1990). (3) 
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of intra-EC trade predominantly in the form of intra-industry flows. This meant relatively 
modest income redistributional effects within member states, as their industrial structure 
was little affected by intra-industry specialisation. 
The  situation  has  radically  changed  with  the  accession  of  new  members  to  the 
Community. The EC is now divided into a North (with a per capita GDP above the EC-12 
average)  and  a  South  (with  a  per  capita  GDP  below  the  EC-12  average),  the  latter 
comprising of Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain.26 This has tended to give relatively 
greater  importance  to  inter-industry  specialisation  associated  with  exploitation  of 
comparative  advantage.27  In tum,  such  specialisation may be  causing  more  adjustment 
problems than past integration. 
In  addition,  the  new  Community  configuration  raises  the  crucial  issue  of the  linkage 
between economic integration and inter-country income disparities. Two opposite views 
prevail. Those who believe in the neoclassical paradigm, adopt an optimistic attitude. This 
is the case of Neven (1990),  who  examined the distribution of the benefits from  1992 
among member states. He found relatively small gains for the North, but important ones 
for the South. On the other hand, those who attach more importance in the role of non-
convexities in shaping economic outcomes, are less optimistic about the automaticity of 
convergence  inside  the  EC.  For  instance,  the  theoretical  analysis  by  Bertola  (1992) 
suggests that a tendency towards production concentration in the North can be expected in 
post-1992 Europe if  economic growth is driven solely by private investment decisions. 
Mindful of the convergence issue, the Community has undertaken large income transfers 
from the North to the South. Today, such transfers account for about one-quarter of the 
EC  budget and represent a substantial proportion of the  South's investment in physical 
infrastructure. 
4. Conclusion 
At the end of the day, the evidence strongly suggests that the process of EC  integration 
has been beneficial to both the Community itself and her trading partners. This favorable 
outcome  is,  to  a  large  extent,  due  to  the  fact  that  integration  has  led  to  substantial 
multilateral trade liberalisation, beyond what could have materialised without the EC.  As 
Lawrence  (1991)  noted:  'The postwar experience  of the  EC is  heartening.  Increasing 
European integration after the Treaty of  Rome was quite compatible with the lowering of 
Europe's external barriers." (p.26). The obvious exception is temperate agriculture, where 
increasingly high levels of external protection have produced great costs. 
26  Based on purchasing-power comparisons. See European Economy. No50, Table 9. 
27  Neven (1990). - 12-
Some might, however, wonder whether the EC is likely to maintain her active support in 
favour of  the multilateral trade system. Those who worry point to two developments. The 
frrst  concerns the network of regional agreements built around the EC and described in 
Table 1. Half the share of extra-EC trade is accounted for by trade with regional partners: 
EFT  A,  eastern Europe and southern neighbours (Mediterranean and ACP  countries).  If 
one adds this to the share of  intra-EC trade, one can observe that roughly 80 percent of  EC 
trade  is intra-regional (see Table 2). The second concern relates to the parallel movement 
towards regionalism in America and Asia. 
The emergence of a tripolar world raises vital questions. In the coming years, regionalism 
can either contribute to or be detrimental to the multilateral trading system. As Jacquemin 
and  Sapir  ( 1991 b)  remarked,  the  outcome  will  depend  upon  which  of the  'natural 
integration' or 'strategic integration' scenarios will prevail. The former refers to a situation 
where natural trading (i.e.  regional)  partners form a trading arrangement with an  open 
external trade policy, which benefits the world at large. On the contrary, the latter implies 
an arrangement aimed at making gains at the expense of other nations. If the three blocs 
decide to play a noncooperative game, natural integration would be used as  leverage for 
strategic conduct, with detrimental consequences for all. 
The construction of the European Community is  a noble, but difficult task.  Has it been 
successful? The answer is, undoubtedly, yes.  The EC has contributed to create a zone of 
peace in a continent which had been torn apart by two world wars and where nationalism 
is always latent. It has also brought prosperity to its citizens. However, as with any such 
endeavour, there is always a risk that the architects may lose sight of the global picture 
and  fall  prey  to  'eurocentrism'.  So  far,  the  Community  has  avoided  this  danger  by 
generally pursuing a liberal external trade policy. As it moves towards deeper and wider 
integration, the EC should strive to reinforce its commitment toward the multilateral trade 
system in order to ensure cooperative solutions. 1
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Table  3 
commodity  Group  1980  1985  1987  1989  1991 
22  metal processing  52.2  54.0  55.5  54.7  54.2 
24  mineral processing  76.2  73.5  74.1  72.1  69.3 
25-26  chemicals  70.0  67.9  69.0  67.2  66.8 
2  62.3  63.2  64.9  62.9  62.8 
31  metal articles  69.6  68.7  69.2  67.2  66.7 
32  mechanical  engineer  65.7  61.1  62.8  61.8  60.9 
33  office machines  49.4  50.0  51.3  50.3  49.5 
34  electrical products  54.6  49.6  51.5  49.6  49.2 
35  motor vehicules  77.6  71.3  72.5  70.6  68.5 
36  other transport equ  32.9  39.9  43.9  48.8  47.3 
37  precision instrumen  47.2  43.7  47.0  45.4  46.3 
3  60.9  57.1  59.5  57.7  56.7 
41-42  food,  drink and tob  62.3  65.1  68.8  69.7  71.5 
43  textiles  57.6  58.8  55.2  52.5  49.6 
44  leather products  43.7  46.2  42.6  38.7  36.8 
45  footwear  and clothi  48.9  47.0  43.2  40.3  37.7 
46  wood  and products  35.2  39.3  40.8  41.4  44.6 
47  paper and products  42.7  44.8  46.0  44.6  47.8 
48  rubber and plastic  75.9  73.8  74.1  71.7  70.7 
49  other manufactures  22.7  27.1  31.2  '37.6  38.5 
4  49.4  52.6  53.1  52.4  53.1 
Total  57.3  57.2  58.6  57.3  56.9 
EC-9. -- ~------- ~  - ------
-16-
Table4 
Country 
Belgium-Luxembourg  0.54  0.60  0.66  0.69  0.70  0.77 
Denmark  0.41  0.52  0.57 
France  0.61  0.68  0.73  0.76  0.83  0.83 
Germany  0.47  0.57  0.67  0.73  0.78  0.76 
Greece  0.22  0.24  0.31 
Ireland  0.36  0.61  0.62 
Italy  0.42  0.48  0.59  0.63  0.55  0.57 
Netherlands  0.50  0.57  0.64  0.67  0.73  0.76 
Portugal  0.23  0.32  0.37 
Spain  0.35  0.57  0.64 
United Kingdom  0.74  0.81  0.77 
(*)computed with EC-6 trade data,(**) computed with EC-12 trade data. 
Sources: Balassa (1975) for columns (1) (2) and (3), and Buigues et al. (1990) for columns (4)  (5) and (6). T
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TableS 
Country  1958  External Tariff  External Tariff after 
in 1968  the Kennedy Round 
Benelux  9.7  10.4  6.6 
France  17.0  10.4  6.6 
Germany  6.4  10.4  6.6 
Italy  18.7  10.4  6.6 
Simple average  13.0  10.4  6.6 
Change from previous level  -20%  -40% 
Source: Resnick and Truman, (1975), Table 2.4. - 19-
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